A sequential-move version of a given normal-form game Γ is an extensive-form game of perfect information in which each player chooses his action after observing the actions of all players who precede him and the payoffs are determined according to the payoff functions in Γ. A normal-form game Γ is sequentially solvable if each of its sequential-move versions has a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies such that the players' actions on the equilibrium path constitute an equilibrium of Γ.
A crowding game (or a congestion game with player-speci c payoff functions; Milchtaich, 1996) is an n-person normal-form game Γ where each player i chooses one action j from a common nite set A of actions, and receives a payoff which is a nonincreasing function S i j of the total number n j of players choosing j. (n j ) j2A is called the congestion vector. The actions chosen by the players constitute a (pure-strategy Nash) equilibrium of Γ if the action σ i chosen by each player i is a best response for that player against the actions chosen by the other players. Formally, an action pro le σ = (σ 1 ; σ 2 ; : : : ; σ n ) 2 A n is an equilibrium if and only if, for every player i and action j, S iσ i (n σ i ) S i j (n j + 1). Every symmetric crowding game is also a congestion game, as de ned in Rosenthal (1973; see below) . The class of all congestion games coincides with the class of potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) . This implies, in particular, that every such game has at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Nonsymmetric crowding games, however, generally do not admit a potential function.
Given any n-person normal-form game Γ, a sequential-move version of Γ is an extensive-form game of perfect information in which the n players are put in some xed order, each player chooses his action after observing the choices of all players who precede him, and the payoffs are determined according to the payoff functions in Γ. There are n! ways of ordering the players, and each order de nes a different sequential-move version of Γ. As is well known, an extensive-form game of perfect information always has at least one subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. We will say that the (simultaneous-move) game Γ is sequentially solvable if each of its sequential-move versions has at least one subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies such that the players' actions on the equilibrium path constitute a (Nash) equilibrium of Γ. 1 The main result of this paper is the following: Theorem 1. Every crowding game is sequentially solvable.
It follows, in particular, from Theorem 1 that every crowding game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. For a computationally ef cient algorithm for nding such an equilibrium, and for a discussion of convergence to an equilibrium, see Milchtaich (1996) . At least one of the (pure-strategy) equilibria of every crowding game is a strong equilibrium (Konishi et al., 1997a ). This is not generally true for congestion games. See, however, Holzman and Law-Yone (1997), were suf cient conditions for the existence of a strong equilibrium in such games are obtained.
Sequential-move equilibria
By Theorem 1, every sequential-move version of a given crowding game Γ has a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies such that the action pro le played on the equilibrium path is an equilibrium of Γ. Such an action pro le will be said to be a sequential-move equilibrium of Γ. The question naturally arises, whether all equilibria of a given crowding game are sequential-move equilibria. The following example shows that the answer, in general, is "no."
Consider a two-person, two-action crowding game where S 11 (1) > S 12 (1) > 0, S 22 (1) > S 21 (1) > 0, and 0 > S i j (2) for every i and j. This game has two equilibria: (1; 2) and (2; 1). However, only the rst equilibrium is a sequentialmove equilibrium; there is no subgame-perfect equilibrium of a sequential-move version of this game in which the second action pro le is played.
The second equilibrium of the above game is Pareto dominated by the rst one. 2 As we will presently see, this is no accident: every equilibrium of a crowding game which is not Pareto dominated by another equilibrium of the game is a sequential-move equilibrium.
In every crowding game, an equilibrium which is not Pareto dominated by another equilibrium is strong in the sense of Aumann (1959) : there exists no group of players who can increase their payoffs by simultaneously changing their actions, if the rest of the players do not change their actions. This follows from the fact that if an equilibrium σ is not strong, so that there is an action prole σ 0 6 = σ such that, for every player i for which σ 0 i 6 = σ i , player i's payoff when σ 0 is played is strictly higher than his payoff when σ is played, then σ 0 is an equilibrium and it Pareto dominates σ . To prove this fact, note rst that the congestion vector (n 0 j ) j2A corresponding to σ 0 is equal to the congestion vector (n j ) j2A corresponding to σ . Indeed, n 0 j > n j for some j would imply that there is a player, i, for which σ 0 i = j and σ i 6 = j. But it follows from our assumption concerning σ 0 and from the monotonicity of S i j that in such a case S iσ i (n σ i ) < S i j (n 0 j ) S i j (n j + 1)-a contradiction to the assumption that σ is an equilibrium. Since the two congestion vectors are equal, for every player i for which σ 0 i = σ i , player i's payoff when σ 0 is played is equal to his payoff when σ is played. It follows that σ 0 Pareto dominates σ . Also, since σ is an equilibrium,
for every player i and action j. Hence, σ 0 , too, is an equilibrium.
For generic 3 crowding games the converse is also true: an equilibrium σ that is Pareto dominated by another equilibrium σ 0 is not strong. The reason is that, in such a case, for every player i for which σ 0 i 6 = σ i , player i's payoff when σ 0 is played cannot be equal to, and is therefore strictly higher than, his payoff when σ is played.
Theorem 2. Every strong equilibrium of a crowding game Γ is a sequentialmove equilibrium of Γ.
The converse of Theorem 2 is false; not every sequential-move equilibrium of a crowding game is strong. Consider, for example, the sequential-move version of a three-person, three-action generic crowding game where
otherwise and the players move in the order 1, 2, 3. If player 1 plays 1, then player 2 will play 2 and player 3 will play 1. If player 1 plays 2, then player 2 will play 3 and player 3 will play 1. Player 1's payoff is negative in the former case and positive in the latter case. The unique sequential-move equilibrium corresponding to this sequential-move version is therefore (2; 3; 1). However, this equilibrium is not strong; and it is Pareto dominated by the other equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game, (1; 3; 2).
When a crowding game has only one sequential-move equilibrium, that equilibrium may be said to be commitment robust (Rosenthal, 1991) . It follows as a corollary from Theorem 2 that a necessary condition for an equilibrium of a crowding game to be commitment robust is that it Pareto dominates all other equilibria. However, as the last example shows, this condition is not suf cient for commitment robustness.
Other games Rosenthal (1973) introduced a class of (congestion) games that are similar in some respects to the games considered here. In this class of games, the set of strategies of each player is not the set A of actions but some subset of the power set of A; each player chooses a combination of actions. A player's payoff is the sum of the payoffs associated with each of the actions included in his choice. The payoff associated with action j is an arbitrary function c j of the number n j of players who include j in their choice. Rosenthal (1973) proved that each game in this class has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Nevertheless, the following example shows that in this class of games Theorems 1 and 2 do not hold.
Consider a three-person symmetric game where the set of actions is A = f1; 2; 3; 4g and the common set of strategies is ff1g; f2g; f3g; f1; 4g; f2; 3; 4gg. Suppose that c 1 (1) = 10, c 1 (2) = 0, c 2 (1) = 3, c 3 (1) = 2, c 4 (1) = 1, and c j (m) < 10 otherwise. A sequential-move version of this game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, in which the rst player plays f1; 4g, the second player plays f2g, and the third player plays f3g. This, however, is not an equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game: the rst player can increase his payoff from 9 to 10 by unilaterally shifting to f1g. And (f1g; f2g; f3g) is a strong equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game. But if the rst player played f1g in the sequential-move version of the game then the second player would play f2; 3; 4g and the third player would play f1g, and so the payoff of the rst player would in this case be zero.
Another closely related class of games in which the main result of the present paper does not hold is games in which crowding has a positive effect on players' payoffs (Konishi et al., 1997b) . Consider, for example, a three-player, three-action game where the following inequalities hold:
(1) > 0, and 0 > S i j (m) otherwise. As can be readily veri ed, this game does not even have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proofs
It suf ces to prove Theorems 1 and 2 for generic crowding games. The reason is that, for every crowding game Γ, every sequential-move versionΓ of Γ, and every generic crowding game Γ 0 close enough to Γ, 4 the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the sequential-move version of Γ 0 in which the order of players is the same as inΓ is also a subgame-perfect equilibrium ofΓ, and every equilibrium of Γ 0 is also an equilibrium of Γ. Also, for every strong equilibrium σ of Γ, Γ 0 can be chosen in such a way that σ is also a strong equilibrium of Γ 0 . Notice, however, that a sequential-move version of a non-generic crowding game may possess pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria whose equilibrium paths do not correspond to equilibria of the simultaneous-move game.
Every subgame of a sequential-move versionΓ of a given generic crowding game Γ is itself a sequential-move version of some generic crowding game. Speci cally, suppose that the players move in the order 1; 2; : : : ; n. The subgame ofΓ determined by a given path (σ 1 ; σ 2 ; : : : ; σ i ) (1 i n) is a sequentialmove version of a unique (n i)-person generic crowding game, which will be called the subgame of Γ determined by (σ 1 ; σ 2 ; : : : ; σ i ). The equilibrium path (σ i+1 ; σ i+2 ; : : : ; σ n ) of the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame ofΓ determined by (σ 1 ; σ 2 ; : : : ; σ i ) will be called the subgame equilibrium path determined by (σ 1 ; σ 2 ; : : : ; σ i ). The congestion vector corresponding to the action pro le (σ 1 ; σ 2 ; : : : ; σ n ) will be referred to as the congestion vector determined by (σ 1 ; σ 2 ; : : : ; σ i ). Note that, since in a crowding game a player's payoff is affected only by the number of other players playing each action, the same subgame, subgame equilibrium path, and congestion vector are determined by (σ τ(1) ; σ τ(2) ; : : : ; σ τ(i) ), where τ is an arbitrary permutation of f1; 2; : : : ; ig. The proof of Theorem 1 depends on the following lemma:
Lemma. In a generic crowding game, let (n j ) j2A be the congestion vector determined by (σ 1 ) and let (n 0 j ) j2A be the congestion vector determined by (σ 0 1 ) (σ 1 ; σ 0 1 2 A). Then, for every j, n 0 j n j + 1, and equality holds for at most one j, which is not σ 1 .
Proof of Theorem 1. Let Γ be a generic crowding game. It suf ces to show that the action pro le σ played on the equilibrium path of the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the sequential-move version of Γ in which the players move in the order 1; 2; : : : ; n is an equilibrium of Γ. If σ is not an equilibrium then, for some i and j, S i j (n j + 1) > S iσ i (n σ i ), where (n k ) k2A is the congestion vector correspond-ing to σ . Without loss of generality, i = 1. (If not, then consider not Γ but the subgame determined by (σ 1 ; σ 2 ; : : : ; σ i 1 ).) Set σ 0 1 = j, and let (n 0 k ) k2A be the congestion vector determined by (σ 0 1 ). By the lemma, and the monotonicity of S 1 j , S 1 j (n 0 j ) S 1 j (n j + 1) > S 1σ 1 (n σ 1 ). But this contradicts the assumption that σ is played on the equilibrium path: player 1 could have achieved more by playing j (instead of σ 1 ).
Proof of the lemma. The proof proceeds by induction on the number n of players. The lemma is evidently true if n = 1. Assume that it holds true for every (n 1)-person generic crowding game, and let an n-person (n 2) generic crowding game be given. It is always possible to view the game as a subgame of an (n + 1)-person generic crowding game, more speci cally the subgame determined by (σ 0 ), the play of the 0-th player. Moreover, it may be assumed that σ 1 and σ 0 1 are different from σ 0 , and that σ 0 is such that S iσ 0 (1) < S i j (n + 1) for every i and j 6 = σ 0 . The latter assumption implies that, in every equilibrium of every subgame of the (n + 1)-person game, no player plays σ 0 .
Let (n 1 j ) j2A be the congestion vector determined by (σ 0 ; σ 1 ), and let (n 1 0 j ) j2A be the congestion vector determined by (σ 0 ; σ 0 1 ). For every j 6 = σ 0 , n 1 j = n j and n 1 0 j = n 0 j . If (σ 2 ; : : : ; σ n ) is the subgame equilibrium path determined by (σ 0 ; σ 1 ) and (σ 0 2 ; : : : ; σ 0 n ) is the subgame equilibrium path determined by (σ 0 ; σ 0 1 ) then (n 1 j ) j2A is also the congestion vector determined by (σ 0 ; σ 2 ; σ 1 ) and (n 1 0 j ) j2A is also the congestion vector determined by (σ 0 ; σ 0 2 ; σ 0 1 ). If σ 2 = σ 0 2 then it follows from the induction hypothesis, applied to the (n 1)-person subgame determined by (σ 0 ; σ 2 ), that n 1 0 j n 1 j + 1 for every j, equality holds for at most one j, but n
It also follows from the induction hypothesis that, symmetrically, n 1 j n 1 0 j + 1 for every j, equality holds for at most one j, but n
We have to show that (1) and (1 0 ) also hold if σ 2 6 = σ 0
2 . In what follows, we will assume that the last inequality holds. In the course of the proof we will consider several subgames, each one determined by a particular triplet of actions, as well as the congestion vectors determined by these triplets. The triplets, preceded by the index of the congestion vector they determine, are shown in Fig. 1 . A straight line in this gure indicates that the two triplets connected by the line differ in exactly one of the three actions. The roman number near the line refers to the equation which, in the sequel, is deduced from this relation between the two triplets by means of the induction hypothesis, applied to the subgame determined by the two common actions. Let (n 2 j ) j2A be the congestion vector determined by (σ 0 ; σ 0 1 ; σ 2 ). This is the congestion vector that would result if player 2 did not change his action as a response to the change of player 1's action from σ 1 to σ 0 1 . (n 2 j ) j2A is also the congestion vector determined by (σ 0 ; σ 2 ; σ 0 1 ). It hence follows from the induction hypothesis that either
We will consider each of these two cases separately. It also follows from the induction hypothesis that n
and n 2
. In light of the latter inequality, (ia) is possible only if σ 2 6 = σ 1 .
CASE (ia)
(iii)
Since n 
Similarly, since n 3
Let (n 4 j ) j2A be the congestion vector determined by (σ 0 ; σ 0 1 ; σ 1 ). By the induction hypothesis, n
Since n 3
Since (n 4 j ) j2A is also the congestion vector determined by (σ 0 ; σ 1 ; σ 0 1 ), and since the congestion vector determined by (σ 0 ; σ 1 ; σ 2 ) is (n 1 j ) j2A , by the induction hypothesis n
It follows from (ia), (v), (vii), and (viii) that n 3 j n 1 j for every j 6 = σ 0 . Hence, by (iii), n 1 0 j n 1 j + 1 for every j and equality holds for at most one j. Since ∑ j n 1 0 j = ∑ j n 1 j = n + 1, it follows that n 1 j n 1 0 j + 1 for every j and equality holds for at most one j. To complete the proof of (1) 
CASE (ib)
. Since the action of player 2 in the subgame equilibrium path determined by (σ 0 ; σ 0 1 ) is σ 0 2 , it must be that S 2σ 0
). Since we have assumed that σ 0 2 6 = σ 2 , the assumed genericity of the game implies that this inequality is in fact strict. Similarly, since the action of player 2 in the subgame equilibrium path determined by (σ 0 ; σ 1 ) is σ 2 , it must be that S 2σ 2 (n 1
where (n 2 0 j ) j2A is the congestion vector determined by (σ 0 ; σ 1 ; σ 0 2 ). Note that, formally, the last triplet is obtained from the triplet (σ 0 ; σ 0 1 ; σ 2 ) that determines (n 2 j ) j2A by taking the prime off σ 1 and adding a prime to σ 2 ; hence the index 2 0 : By (ib) and the monotonicity of S 2σ 2 , S 2σ 0 
Formally, (xiii) is a "primed" version of (ia). More precisely, the transformation that interchanges σ 1 with σ 0 1 and σ 2 with σ 0 2 transforms (ia) into (xiii). Hence, our analysis of case (ia) implies at once that the formal transforms of (1) and (1 0 ) hold true. But these transforms are (1 0 ) and (1), respectively. Thus, (1) and (1 0 ) hold in the present case, too.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof proceeds by induction on the number n of players. The theorem is evidently true if n = 1. Assume that it holds true for every (n 1)-person generic crowding game, and let σ be a strong equilibrium of an n-person (n 2) generic crowding game. Consider the directed graph, with n vertices corresponding one-to-one to the players in the game, where an arc is going from vertex i to vertex i 0 if and only if player i envies player i 0 when σ is played, that is, if and only if S iσ i (n σ i ) < S iσ i 0 (n σ i 0 ), where (n j ) j2A is the congestion vector corresponding to σ . The assumption that σ is a strong equilibrium implies that this graph has no cycles. Indeed, if the graph had a cycle then the players involved could change their actions-each player shifting to the action played by the player he envies-and they all would gain. Therefore, there exists a player, i, who envies no other player; S iσ i (n σ i ) > S i j (maxf1; n j g) holds for every j 6 = σ i . Without loss of generality, i = 1. (σ 2 ; σ 3 ; : : : ; σ n ) is a strong equilibrium of the subgame determined by (σ 1 ). Hence, by the induction hypothesis, it is also a sequential-move equilibrium of that subgame, say the sequential-move equilibrium corresponding to the sequential-move version in which the players move in the order 2; 3; : : : ; n. To prove that σ is a sequential-move equilibrium of the n-person game, it suf ces to show that, in the sequential-move version of that game in which the players move in the order 1; 2; : : : ; n, player 1 cannot gain from choosing an action j different from σ 1 . Let (n 0 k ) k2A be the congestion vector determined by ( j). By the lemma, n 0 j n j (and, of course, n 0 j 1). It therefore follows from our assumption concerning player 1 that S 1 j (n 0 j ) S 1 j (maxf1; n j g) < S 1σ 1 (n σ 1 ). Thus, playing σ 1 is indeed the best option for player 1.
